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PROFESSOR BREST ON STATE ACTION AND LIBERAL-
THEORY, AND A POSTSCRIPT TO PROFESSOR STONE
FRANK I. GOODMAN t
Paul Brest, as always, has powerfully illuminated his subject.
His analysis of the state action problem is searching, subtle, and
generally sound. The part I find most intriguing, however, is the
one with which I least agree. I refer to Brest's attempt to establish
conceptual and historical connections between the state action
doctrine and two substantive constitutional theories, positivism and
natural law, representing polar tendencies in liberal thought. My
comments will be addressed primarily to this aspect of Brest's paper.
I also comment briefly on Professor Stone's excellent discussion
of governmental tort immunity.
I. STATE ACTION, POSITIVISM, AND NATURAL LAW
Professor Brest finds it incongruous, if not strictly inconsistent,
that a "constitutional positivist" like Justice Rehnquist-one who
holds that all rights of property and contract are created by the
state-should nevertheless deny that the "private" exercise of those
rights is "state action." His thesis, he tells us, is that "positivists-
which means most of us most of the time-cannot so readily have
it both ways." 1 "[S]ince any private action acquiesced in by the
state can be seen to derive its power from the state, which is free
to withdraw its authorization at will, positivism potentially impli-
cates the state in every 'private' action not prohibited by law." 2
Applying these generalizations to Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,-
Brest properly distinguishes between two separate questions:
(a) whether the creditor's self-help enforcement of the warehouse-
man's lien was state action; 4 and (b) whether the existence of a
state statute permitting that self-help enforcement was state action.
His claim is that Justice Rehnquist answered both questions nega-
tively, that both answers were wrong, and that both were incon-
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1959, Har-
vard University; B.A. 1956, Oxford University.
I Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on F]agg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1302 (1982).
2 Id. 1301.
3 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
4 Brest, supra note 1, at 1310-14.
5 Id. 1315-16.
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sistent with Justice Rehnquist's positivist view -that all property
rights (those of debtor and creditor alike) are state-created.
In contrast to the tension Brest perceives between state action
and positivism is the mutual sympathy he finds between state action
and positivism's rival, the doctrine of natural rights. "Under a
regime of natural law, the state's enforcement of fundamental
property and contractual interests is not the product of state policy.
or action, but the recognition of preexisting, natural rights of
property and contractual liberty." 6 Hence, for Justice Peckham,
author of the famous natural rights opinion in Lochner v. New
York, 7 "a New York court's enforcement of the contract between
Lochner and his employees would not have been state action,"
whereas its refusal to enforce the contract was "state action of the
most egregious sort." 8 "[N]atural rights doctrine," writes Brest,
"posits a sphere of autonomous private conduct immune from state
regulation; the state action doctrine protects that sphere from
certain kinds of governmental interference. It is no coincidence
that state action was born during the ascendency of a constitutional
jurisprudence of natural rights" -- and that the author of the
Court's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,10 Justice Bradley, was
"a strong advocate of the constitutional enforcement of natural
rights." 1
Professor Brest's contention that state action and natural rights
are cut from the same philosophical cloth is only partly convincing.
It is true that both doctrines are based on respect for the values of
privacy, property, and personal autonomy, and that a judge's
assessment of the degree to which these values are implicated in
particular instances of nongovernmental conduct will weigh heavily
in his decision whether to classify that conduct as state action.
This alone, however, does not justify (or even make fully intel-
ligible) Brest's assertion that "natural rights doctrine posits a
sphere of private conduct immune from state regulation," while
"state action doctrine protects that sphere from certain kinds of
governmental interference." The only "governmental interfer-
ence" from which the state action doctrine protects any private
conduct are the judicially enforced prohibitions of the federal
Constitution itself. Brest cannot mean that. the immunity from
6 Id. 1299.
7 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
8 Brest, supra note 1, at 1299.
9 Id. 1300 (footnote omitted).
10 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11 Brest, supra note 1, at 1300 (footnote on-_itted).
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state regulation "posited" by natural rights as a philosophical
matter is made constitutionally enforceable by the state. action
doctrine, ,since- it, is clear that the latter affords' no constitutional
protection whatever against state regulation of any kind. More-
over, the "sphere of private conduct" insulated from state iegula-
tion by the natural rights doctrine is not even remotely coextensive
with the sphere of private conduct exempted from constitutional
limitations by the state action doctrine. --Even the- most zealous
defender of natural rights would concede that only a small fraction
of human activity falls into that category, whereas the state action
doctrine, as the Supreme Court has- applied it for a century, re-
moves virtually all private conduct from the purview of the four-
teenth amendment. The most that can be said, -therefore, is that
the natural rights doctrine protects a limited. class of private con-
duct from governmental interference generally, while the state
action doctrine insulates private conduct generally from a single
type of governmental regulation, that imposed by- the federal
Constitution itself.
Even this formulation, however, -exaggerates the companion-
ability of the two doctrines. If one compares them not in terms
of their substantive implications, but in terms of the respective
roles they allocate to the political and judicial processes, the rela-
tionship between the state action and natural rights doctrines
becomes one of mutual tension rather-than mutual sympathy. The
former reserves. to the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment, while the latter entrusts to the courts, decisions as to whether
the restrictions imposed by the fourteenth amendment on state
government should be brought to bear on private conduct as
well-whether a private restaurant should be forbidden to refuse
service on racial grounds; a shopping center to exclude political
reafletters; a private employer to terminate an employee without
a hearing. From this perspective, the state action doctrine has
far more in common with positivism than with natural rights
theory. The constitutional enforcement of natural rights demands
an assertive judiciary; positivism, on the other-hand, is compatible
with a judiciary that bows to the value preferences of the political
branches. Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Lochner, char-
acterized by Brest as a paradigm -of positivism,12 is perhaps more
often regarded as a classic expression of judicial self-restraint, 'and
the doctrinal sea change by which Holmes's dissent in Lo~hner
became the law of the land was a transition not only from natural
12 Id. 1297.
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rights to positivism, but also from an era of judicial boldness to
one of judicial deference. In sum, whereas Brest, comparing them
in substantive terms, sees natural rights and state action as com-
plementary doctrines, both of which insulate private conduct from
one or another kind of government interference, a comparison in
terms of "process" would find instead a complementarity between
positivism and state action, both insulating the political processes
from constitutional limitations of one kind or another and leaving
them free to adjust the competing interests of private actors without
close judicial oversight.
Brest is also wide of the mark in his historical speculation
that it was "no coincidence" state action doctrine originated in
the era of ascendant natural rights jurisprudence and in an opinion
written by a Justice committed to that jurisprudence. Brest seems
to be implying that Justice Bradley's holding in the Civil Rights
Cases-that racial discrimination by private inns, theaters, and rail-
roads was not "state action" under section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment and therefore not subject to regulation by Congress
under section 5-reflected the tenderness of a natural law judge for
the property rights of these discriminators. This is clearly not the
case. Far from believing that the defendant discriminators were
exercising natural rights constitutionally immune from state regu-
lation, Bradley explicitly based his no-state-action ruling on the
assumption that state law could, and generally did, forbid such
discrimination.13 The only natural rights mentioned in his opinion
were the "essential rights" of the victims of discrimination to
"equal accommodations and privileges" in inns and public con-
veyances.' 4 The Court assumed without deciding that the failure
of the states to vindicate those rights would have amounted to
unconstitutional state action. In sum, it was not because of, but
in spite of, his natural law orientation that Justice Bradley accepted
the no-state-action defense. Rather than having given birth to the
state action doctrine, the prevailing natural rights philosophy very
nearly strangled the infant in its cradle.
The Civil Rights Cases set the pattern for future litigation in-
volving the state action doctrine. Seldom has there been a sub-
stantial basis for claiming that the putative state actor was exer-
cising a constitutionally protected natural right, and never has the
rejection of the state action defense been predicated on this ground.
Typically, it is the victim, not the perpetrator, of "state action"
'3 109 U.S. at 18-19.
14Id. 19.
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who puts forward some form of natural rights claim, while the
perpetrator resists that claim, at the threshold by invoking the state
action doctrine, and."on the merits" by a positivist argumnent deny-
ing the existence of the right.
That the natural rights and state action doctrines are typically
invoked by opposing parties in litigation does not in itself imply
any philosophical tension'between the two. An element of tension
does exist, however. Natural law theory holds that individuals
have rights of life, liberty, and 'property not only against the tate
but, antecedently, against one another, and -that the protection of
those prepolitical rights is the very purpose for which "[g]overn-
ments are instituted among men." -15 A-fourteenth amendment that
enacted Locke's Second -Treatise on Government or Jefferson's
Declaration of Independence may not impose on the states an
affirmative duty to provide that protection. This need not, in the
very strictest sense, bring natural rights theory into collision with
the state action doctrine, since the latter does not have to be con-
strued as ruling out affirmative governmental duties to protect
citizen against citizen. While insisting that the fourteenth amend-
ment does not apply to private conduct per se, and that such con-
duct does not become state action merely because the state has
chosen not to prohibit it, the doctrine can be understood as leaving
open the substantive constitutional question whether the state's own
failure to control certain types of private conduct (whether that
failure be called "action" or "inaction") violates the amendment.
The constitutional enforcement of a citizen's natural right to af-
firmative governmental protection against victimization by fellow
citizens can thus be squared with the state action doctrine through
a holding that nonprovision of such protection is unconstitutional
state action. An example of such reasoning is Justice Bradley's
intimation in the Civil Rights Cases that individuals may have an
"essential right" of nondiscriminatory access to places of public
accommodation, that the states are obligated by the fourteenth
amendment to implement that right, and that their failure to do
so would amount to unconstitutional state action. 16 Professor Brest
offers another illustration in his suggestion that Justice Peckham in
Lochner would have found a state court's refusal to uphold the
employment contract to be "state action of the most egregious
sort." 17 But although the doctrines technically can be reconciled
!5 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
16 109 'U.S. at 19; see supia text accompanying notes 13-14.
17 Brest, supra note 1, at 1299. " . .
1'335
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in this fashion, there is no denying the uneasiness of the relation-
ship. The recognition of affirmative governmental duties to regu-
late private conduct, though consistent perhaps with the letter of
the state action requirement, is in derogation of its basic philosophy:
that the conflicting interests of nongovernmental actors should, in
general at least, be resolved through the democratic political process
(or through legislatively reversible common-law adjudication) rather
than through judicial application of the fourteenth amendment.
More fundamentally, the essential function of the state action doc-
trine is to restrict the coverage of the fourteenth amendment,
whereas that of the natural rights doctrine is to expand that cover-
age. Given this basic difference, and given also the conflicting
implications of the two doctrines with respect to the role of the
courts vis-a-vis the political process, it is not surprising that the state
action doctrine has long survived "the ascendency of a constitutional.
jurisprudence of natural rights" or that the Court's most eloquent
opponent of that natural rights jurisprudence, Justice Hugo Black,
could at the same time be among the strongest supporters of the
state action doctrine.'8
II. BREST'S VIEWS ON STATE ACTION
Implicit in Professor Brest's analysis of doctrinal relationships,
and also in his discussion of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 9 are certain
views of his own about state action. Specifically, Brest states or
implies the following: (a) that private conduct in the exercise of a
state-created right is state- action; (b) that the statutory or decisional
rule that creates the right and authorizes the conduct likewise is*
state action; (c) that private conduct in the exercise of a constitu-
1S Compare, for example, Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 515-16, 522-24 (1965) (rejecting "natural law due
process philosophy") with his dissenting opinion, joined by two other Justices, in
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318, 335-43 (1964) (rejecting, among other things,
the conclusion that the fourteenth amendment "was written or designed to interfere
with a storekeeper's right to choose his customers or with a property owner's right
to choose his social or business associates, so long as he does not run counter to
valid state or federal regulation"). Compare the latter, in turn, with Justice Black's
concurring opinion six months later in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 268
(1964), in which he joined a unanimous Court in upholding a federal statute
prohibiting racial discrimination by restaurants, hotels, and other places of publie
accommodation, noting that "this Court has consistently held that regulation of the
use of property by the Federal Government or by the States does not violate either
the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendments." Id. 277. It would be hard to imagine
a more striking illustration of the fact that willingness to invoke the state action.
doctrine as a basis for negating constitutional constraints upon private conduct need
not be, and in recent history has not been, an expression of natural rights philosophy,
but on the contrary is consistent with strong hostility to that philosophy.
19 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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tionally protected natural right is not state actibi; -and (d) that a
state statutory or decisional rule -that confirms, or a state process
that enforces, such a right likewise is -not state action.
The second and third pr6positions are self-evident. A statute
-such as the New York lien law in Flagg Brothers, whether or not
constitutionali is plainly state action; unlike Brest,- I doubt that
Justice Rehnquist mearit to deny this truisrii. 20 ' Just as plainly, the
exercise of'a constitutional right could not- be -state action, if only
because the state cannot be held responsible for conduct it is power-
less to control. Brest's other two propositions, however-that the
citizens' exercise of a state-created right is state action but the state's
enforcement of a natural right is not-are counterintuitive and, as I
hope to show, unsound.
A. State-Authorized Private Action as State Action
Consider first the notion that if the state had created the right
to do X, then the actual doing of X, even by a private citizen, is
state action. This proposition is all but explicit in Brest's assertion
that Justice Rehnquist erred, and deviated from his positivist
premises, in holding that the creditor's self-help enforcement in
Flagg Brothers was not state action,21 and it'is at least implicit in his
more general contention that "positivism potentially implicates the
state in every 'private' action not prohibited by law." 22 This view
is hard to accept.
20OExcept for a single footnote sentence, Justice Rebnquist's discussion of the
state action issue focuses exclusively on the behavior of the self-helping creditor,
not on the statute. In that sentence he states that "Eilt would intolerably broaden
...the notion of state action . . . to hold that the mere existence of a body of
property law . . . whether decisional or statutory, itself amounted to 'state action'
even though no state process or state officials were ever involved in enforcing that
body of law." Id. 160 n.10. This language, in "context, can be read as denying
not that the statute was state action, but merely that it was action sufficient to
implicate the state in the private conduct it authorized, or that it was otherwise
unconstitutional.
The very fact that Rehnquist qualified his assertion by conceding that the
case might be different if the statute had authorized a breach of the peace, see
id. 160 n.9, suggests that he may have been addressing the ultimate question of
constitutionality rather than the preliminary question of state action. This is not
to say that Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the constitutionality of the statute was
adequate or his conclusion correct. If all laws authorizing one person summarily
to seize another's property were constitutional, the protectiveness of the due process
clause, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Flagg Brothers dissent, 436 U.S. at
170, would be severely compromised.
21 Brest, supra note 1, at 1307, 1311-14.
22 Id. 1301. It is not clear how much of a hedge the term "potentially" repre-
sents, or what additional tests, if any, unprohibited private conduct must satisfy in
order for a positivist to treat it as state action. If Brest means simply that private
conduct is potentially state action in the way that every native-born American is
1982] 1337COMME.NT,
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Permission by the state to engage in an activity, even when the
state has power to withhold that permission, is not ordinarily
thought of as implicating the state in the activity permitted. The
fact that Pennsylvania licenses me to drive does not put Pennsyl-
vania behind the wheel of my car or make it vicariously responsible
for any accidents I may cause. By the same token, the fact that
state law confers the right to exclude the world from one's property
does not convert the property owner's exercise of that right, even
in a racially discriminatory manner, into state action, though the
statutory rule that creates the right, and the judicial or executive
enforcement of it, clearly is state action.
"What the state authorizes, the state does" may reflect a con-
fusion between two senses in which a state can be said to "authorize"
private action: delegation and permission. When the state au-
thorizes a private individual to perform some action on its behalf-
when, that is, it delegates the performance of a governmental func-
tion-constitutional responsibility for that action rests essentially
on agency principles. But when the state only permits or allows
(and, in that far weaker sense, "authorizes") private individuals to
perform actions on their own behalf, the basis for attributing such
action to the state is, to say the least, obscure. This distinction
does not automatically validate Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that
the creditor's self-help enforcement in Flagg Brothers was not state
action. There is much force in Justice Stevens' dissenting argu-
ment that the "power to order binding, nonconsensual resolution
between debtor and creditor is exactly the sort of power with
which the Due Process Clause is concerned" 23 and is a "govern-
mental function" even when performed by private parties. But
the more sweeping assertion that individuals engaged in ordinary
activities on their own behalf, far removed from the business of
government, are wielding the power of the state-as though those
individuals wore uniforms and badges-merely 'because their con-
duct is not prohibited by state law or protected by the Constitu-
tion, is a notion disquietingly totalitarian, conspicuously artificial,
and in no way deducible from positivism or any other legal or
potentially a President of the United States (technically eligible but unlikely to be
called), if he means, that is, that unprohibited private conduct qualifies as state
action only if it meets further tests such as "governmental function" or "substantial
state involvement," his theory ceases to be interesting. Pending further enlighten-
ment as to the meaning of "potentially," I proceed on the assumption that Brest is
attributing to the positivist the view that virtually all constitutionally unprotected
private conduct not prohibited by law is state action.
23 436 U.S. at 176.
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political doctrine. It is far too broad a gr6und on which to reject
a no-state-action defense in cases such as Flagg Brothers.
Professor Brest finds it anomalous that a positivist like Justice
Rehnquist should reject the public/private dichotomy in denying
that certain conduct is a natural right while simultaneously relying
on it in holding that this. same conduct is not state action. The
two public/private distinctions, however, are quite different. The
one proclaimed by natural lawyers and denied -by positivists is
between conduct subject to and conduct not subject to state regu-
lation, whereas the one embedded in the state action doctrine is
between conduct attributable to and conduct not attributable to
the state. Although it is clear that whatever is "private" in the
first sense must likewise be "private" in the second, there is no
obvious reason why the converse must be true-no obvious reason
why activities that the state can but does not prohibit must on
that account be considered the action of the state; why the power
to prohibit should carry with it the duty to prohibit; why that
which the state is barred from doing, the state must' also bar
others from doing. These conclusions are not deductions from
positivism, nor are they natural extensions of it; indeed, it is not
clear why positivists should be politically or* psychologically
inclined, let alone logically obligated, to draw them.
To be sure, a positivist who rejects a jurisprudence of natural
rights because he attaches less than overriding importance to the
interests-property, economic liberty, privacy, among others-that
claim its protection may be led by that same value judgment to
reject a no-state-action defense predicated in part on respect for
those very interests. But a value judgment that property and
economic liberty are not important enough to be constitutionally
immune from state interference is entirely consistent, both logically
and psychologically, with a judgment that those interests are im-
portant enough to warrant judicial deference to the state's decision
not to interfere. The greater his 'respect for -and confidence in
the democratic political process that generates the state's decision
either way, the easier the positivist will find it to harmonize the
two substantive value judgments. Indeed, those constitutional
positivists, and there are many, who reject natural rights think-
ing primarily out of skepticism as to judges' capacity to identify
those rights in an objective and principled fashion, and out of
conviction that the choice among competing social and moral
values and interests should be made through the political rather
than the judicial -process, are apt to be particularly sympathetic to
1340 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a state action doctrine grounded in part on that same deference to
majoritarian decisionmaking.
It may fairly be asked whether there is any practical difference
between the proposition (with which I agree) that a statutory or
decisional rule permitting private conduct is state action and the
proposition (with which I disagree) that the conduct so permitted
is state action. Does it really matter whether the state action label
is affixed, and the substantive constitutional issue posed, at the rule
level or the conduct level? Indeed it does. Because the state
action determination with respect to private conduct carries heavy
substantive implications, whereas that same determination with
respect to a rule carries none, constitutional violations will be
found more readily in the former than in the latter case. Once
state-authorized private acts are characterized as state action, the
question of their constitutionality will tend to be decided as it
would if the state itself were the actor. Private conduct will be
held unconstitutional whenever the same conduct by public officials
would be so held, and the class of state-authorized private acts
violative of the fourteenth amendment will generally correspond
to the class of governmental acts similarly violative. If it did not
have these substantive consequences, the classification of private
conduct as state action would serve no purpose. Under the alter-
native approach, which focuses on the authorizing rule rather than
the conduct authorized, the fact that the permitted acts would be
unconstitutional if done by public officials neither requires nor
invites the conclusion that the permission itself is unconstitutional.
Only on the extreme assumption that whatever the state cannot
validly do it cannot validly permit or fail to prohibit, would this
approach produce the same results as the other. Few judges are
likely to adopt such a view; most are apt to recognize that affirma-
tive duties of protection, if any there be, are the exception rather
than the rule.
For that matter, when the question presented is the constitu-
tionality of what the state has done or failed to do-such as permit-
ting or not prohibiting certain private conduct-the threshold state
action determination is an entirely superfluous step-in the analysis.
Clarity and economy would be better served if the court moved
immediately to the question whether allowing private individuals
to act as they did amounts to a deprivation by the state of the life,
liberty, or property of the victim or a denial by the state of the
equal protection of the laws. Labelling the permission "state
action" serves no purpose other than to meet the possible defense
[Vol. 130:1331
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that the fourteenth amendment prohibits only acts, not omissions-
action, not inaction; but if the amendment does make -this distinc-
tion critical, the action requirement is unlikely to -be satisfied by -a
.decisional rule, especially a rule unstated by any court prior to the
litigation at hand, or even by a statute that merely grants permis-
sion to do what would be lawful even without it.
B. State Enforcement of a Constitutional Right as
Non-State Action
If Brest is clearly correct in saying that a statutory or decisional
rule is state action (though not necessarily unconstitutional) when
it creates a state-law right to engage in certain activity, he seems
just as clearly wrong in suggesting that a statutory or decisional rule
is not state action when the private rights it declares or enforces are
natural and, presumably, constitutional rights that would exist even
in the absence of state law. This way of looking at state action seems
to me both conceptually flawed and practically unhelpful. Consider
the following case: A state statute barring racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation is challenged by a restaurant owner
(either defensively in a criminal prosecution or offensively in an
anticipatory civil action) as a deprivation of property without due
process of law. Clearly such a challenge would fail, but on what
ground? One might have thought the statute would be routinely
upheld, on the merits, without mention of any threshold "state
action" problem, on the ground that it violated no constitutionally
protected right of the property owner. Under Brest's analysis, ho 'v-
ever, a judge who believed (like Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights
Cases 24) that blacks have a natural right of nondiscriminatory access
to places of public accommodation and that the statute merely con-
firmed this pre-existing right, could properly decide the case on the
threshold ground of no state action. The choice between the two
grounds, "no state action" and "valid state action," is of little prac-
tical importance, since both invariably yield the same result. To
suggest, however, that a statute enacted by a state's legislature and
enforced (or soon to be enforced) by its executive is not "state
action" is to use language in a very odd way-language, one might
add, that is not found in the Constitution itself and not obviously
in need of stylized :construction. Granted, Brest's recommended
usage, however odd, might be acceptable if it served a purpose-for
example,-the avoidance of difficult substantive questions as to the
24See supra text accompanying notes .13-14,
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meaning of constitutional norms such as "liberty," "property," "due
process," or "equal protection." But plainly it does not. On the
contrary, in our hypothetical case, Brest's natural law judge could
answer the "threshold" question of state action only after having
first decided not one but two questions on the merits: whether the
restaurant owner had a constitutional right to choose his -customers
and whether his customers had a constitutional right not to be dis-
criminated against. The first, and easier, question would alone
dispose of the case if the court went directly to the merits without
pausing over the issue (or non-issue) of state action; the latter, more
difficult, question of the customers' natural and constitutional rights
would not arise at all. A state action issue that cannot be answered
until the merits have been decided twice over is neither a threshold
question nor one worth asking.
All this is equally true in the converse situation (no doubt
nearer the one Brest had in mind) of a statute protective of the
discriminator's property rights-for example, a trespass law chal-
lenged (either defensively or offensively) by blacks seeking nondis-
criminatory service in a restaurant that excludes them because of
race. This statute, too, even if it were merely declarative of the
restaurant owner's natural law property rights, should be upheld
on the merits, not, as Brest would have it, at the no-state-action
threshold.
The matter may be less clear when the putative state action
is a decisional rule rather than a statute, but that would be true
even of a decisional rule that did not track natural law. Once it is
granted that a common-law property rule imposing damage liability
on a trespassing sit-in demonstrator is state action no less than its
statutory counterpart, that conclusion ought not be changed by the
added assumption that the rule is declarative of natural law. And
this is true even when the decisional rule is invoked defensively as
a basis for judicial nonintervention, such as the trespass rule relied
upon by a self-helping restaurant owner as a defense to a battery
claim by a trespassing sit-in demonstrator.
It should be emphasized that, in all these cases, "no state
action" is admittedly the appropriate response to a claim that the
owner's own conduct is unconstitutional; that would be true
whether the restaurant owner, his would-be customer, neither, or
both were exercising natural or constitutional rights. If, however,
what the plaintiff claims to be unconstitutional is the trespass rule
itself, no-state-action ceases to be the proper response even on the
assumption that the rule merely codifies natural law.
[Vol. 130:1331
III. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION INVULNERABLE:
CONDUCT PROHIBITED BY THE STATE
In view of the many harsh words that have been spoken about
the public/private dichotomy during this symposium, I cannot re-
sist noting one area in which that distinction, as embodied in the
state action doctrine, seems to me invulnerable. Even if one were
to conclude, with Brest, that private conduct in which the state
acquiesces is state action, no such conclusion would be possible
with respect to conduct that the state itself makes unlawful.
No one, I hope, would dream of arguing that ordinary homi-
cide is a deprivation of life, ordinary kidnapping a deprivation of
liberty, ordinary theft a deprivation of property, in violation of the
fourteenth amendment, even when not committed by an employee
of the state. The contrary view would not only disregard the clear
language of the amendment, it would convert the Constitution into
a comprehensive code of torts and crimes, duplicating or displacing
the mass of state laws on these subjects and transferring to federal
judges, now only a few hundred, a large part of the responsibilities
currently borne by many thousand state judges. This distinction
in treatment between the private and the public does not necessarily
reflect'a felt difference in culpability but a specialization of func-
tions, a division of labor between the Constitution and other law.
It is the business of the Constitution to control government, not to
regulate that sea of primary activity one blushes, in these pages, to
call "the private sector."
It might be replied that what prevents these garden-variety
crimes from being constitutional violations is not that they are com-
mitted by private actors, but that the victims of such crimes are
afforded "due process of law" through post-deprivation damage
remedies, a fact that has been known to defeat constitutional claims
even when directed against the conduct of public officials. Indeed,
such a view would blur the public/private distinction by treating
the misconduct of private individuals in the same way that recent
Supreme Court decisions appear to have treated the misconduct of
state officers.
Two decades ago, in Monroe v. Pape,25 the Court held that
the tortious behavior of police officers can violate the fourteenth
amendment, and be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even though
it simultaneously violates and is actionable under state law. No
decision could more plainly exemplify what Justice Rehnquist
25 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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called the "essential dichotomy" 26 between state actiofi and private
action, for it imposed on police officers a federal damage liability
clearly not imposed on private actors in similar circumstances.
More recently, however, the Court appears to have retreated from
the broader implications of Monroe. In Ingraham v. Wright 27 it
held that corporal punishment administered by school authorities
did not amount to a deprivation of liberty without due process
where a post-deprivation damage remedy was available to the
victims in the state courts. And in Parratt v. Taylor 2 it reached a
similar result with respect to the deprivation of an inmate's
property through the negligence of prison authorities. To what
extent these decisions may have eroded the Monroe principle is
still unclear. It may be that the availability of state post-depriva-
tion remedies will continue to be irrelevant in cases where the
official has violated a specific constitutional provision-such as the
fourth or eighth amendment-not containing the "without due
process" qualification.N It may also be that in a straight fourteenth
amendment case involving a purposeful deprivation of liberty less
hallowed by tradition than corporal punishment, a post-deprivation
damage remedy will fall short of "due process."
For our immediate purposes, however, the point to be stressed
is that even if the Court were to go to the unlikely, extreme of
holding that an official who commits intentional torts violates the
Constitution only if the state fails to provide suitable post-con-
viction relief, and that private action may likewise give rise to a
constitutional violation in those same circumstances, it would
still be misleading to say that the fourteenth amendment reads
directly upon private action as though it began with the words
"No person shall deprive . . . ." Because it is only the state that
can provide or fail to provide "due process of law," it would be
more appropriate to say that a state "deprives [a] person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law" when it permits
him to be deprived of liberty without suitable legal redress-that
is, when it breaches an affirmative duty to protect an individual
from deprivation at the hands of other individuals.
CONCLUSION
Professor Brest's contention that state action and natural rights
are "mutually sympathetic" doctrines is highly questionable. Al-
26 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
27 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
28 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
29 See, e.g., id.
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though both are based on respect for the values of privacy and
personal autonomy, they differ and even clash in other respects.
Natural rights jurisprudence expands the scope of constitutional
protection and the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the political
branches of government, whereas the state action doctrine contracts
both. And while full-blown natural rights theory holds that. the
state is affirmatively obligated to protect citizen against citizen, state
action doctrine, broadly defined, tends in general to deny the exist-
ence of such affirmative duties. Brest's further contention that
private conduct involving the exercise of a state-created right is an
exercise of state power and therefore "state action" is at odds with
our ordinary understanding of the difference between private and
governmental action and unattractively totalitarian in its implica-
tions. Similarly, his suggestion that the governmental enforcement
of a natural right is not "state action" is both conceptually awkward
and practically unworkable. Finally, even if one agreed with Brest
that all private conduct tolerated by the state is state action, the
public/private distinction would still be left standing with respect
to conduct prohibited by state law.
IV. A POSTSCRIPT TO PROFESSOR STONE ON GOvERNMENTAL
TORT IMMUNITY
I wish, finally, to add a few words concerning Professor
Christopher Stone's superb evaluation of the traditional distinction
between public and private corporations with respect to damage lia-
bility for torts.30 Professor Stone's discussion is a model of the kind
of detailed and painstaking examination of possible rationales with-
out which no meaningful conclusions about the public/private dis-
tinction are possible. I suggest, however, that Professor Stone has
placed too little emphasis on what seems to me the strongest argu-
ment in favor of municipal tort liability while ignoring the strong-
est argument against it.
The consideration that most powerfully favors such liability is
to be found, not in the deterrent function of the tort law, but in its
compensatory function. To the tort victim seeking compensation,
it makes no difference whether the mail truck that runs her over
is owned by Purolator or the Post Office. The average municipality,
moreover, is a better-than-average loss spreader. Admittedly, the
familiar argument that, deterrence aside, the compensatory and
risk-spreading goals of tort law would be better served if damages
3oSee Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Dis-
tinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. RBv. 1441 (1982).
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were recoverable from a fund generated by tax revenues than from
tortfeasors themselves is more persuasive when applied to the fed-
eral government, with its heterogeneous tax base and progressive
rate structure, than to local governments, which in many cases
represent low-income constituencies, are financed by relatively re-
gressive property taxes, and, as Professor Ellickson reminds us in
these pages,31 have but limited ability to adopt redistributive
methods of taxation. Nevertheless, even municipal governments
have more room to distribute costs on an ability-to-pay basis than
their private counterparts and typically, one suspects, have larger
and more varied clienteles than most business corporations. At all
events, it is anomalous, if not morally offensive, that in a society
where government at all levels is expected to, and generally does,
render assistance of many kinds to persons victimized by circum-
stances beyond anyone's control, government should disclaim re-
sponsibility for compensating the victims of its own wrongdoing,
even in circumstances where private tortfeasors are called upon
to do so.
The desirability of compensation creates, in my view, a strong
presumption in favor of municipal tort liability, a presumption re-
buttable only by solid evidence that such liability would have a
socially disadvantageous influence on the conduct of managers and
employees of government enterprises. Even if one were to con-
clude, despite Professor Stone's argument to the contrary,32 that
the threat of damage liability is an ineffective deterrent in the
public sector-less effective, at any rate, than the alternative control
mechanisms outlined by Stone-that conclusion would not justify a
rule of tort immunity that left victims uncompensated. A possi-
bility too readily dismissed by Stone, however, is that the threat of
damage liability, rather than having too little deterrent effect, may
have too much of one, discouraging public officials from acting in
the public interest.
Let us assume that, for the reasons Professor Stone gives,
government enterprises are no less effective than private ones in
passing on to their managers, and through them to subordinates,
the balance of incentives, both rewards and penalties, that the
enterprise receives from the outside. Even on that assumption,
there are important differences between public and private entities.
The economic marketplace generally rewards the private firm for
81 See Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519
(1982).
32 See Stone, supra note 30, at 1463-67.
the social benefits it confers but less often penalizes the .enterprise
for the social costs it imposes. The result is a divergence between
the self-interest of the firm and the interest of society. A major
purpose of enterprise liability is to reduce that divergence by
"internalizing" to the firm the social costs it would otherwise not
calculate, thus improving the prospect that the firm, in attempting
to maximize its own net profits, will simultaneously be maximizing
net social benefits.
The public enterprise stands in a different position. For one
thing, it is probably less able than its private counterpart to cap-
ture, through the political and budgetary processes, the social
benefits it generates. Qualitative variations in public goods and
services like education or police protection are typically more
difficult for consumers and beneficiaries to evaluate than qualita-
tive differences among private goods and services, and in any event
the political process offers those consumers less opportunity to
register sensitive preferences among alternative levels or qualities
of service than do the price mechanisms of the economic market-
place. The result is that an increase in arrests or a reduction in
crime seldom produces an increase in the budget or personnel of
the police department; nor does an improvement in test scores
guarantee an increase in the revenues (or even the popularity) of
the school system. In contrast to the private case, there is prob-
ably no reason to assume that the external social costs of most
municipal agencies exceed the external social benefits, so as to
create a divergence between the enterprise's own interest and the
general interest. In this setting, a system of government enterprise
liability runs the risk of creating an imbalance in incentives rather
than, as in the private case, redressing one.
Second, even if one assumes that agencies or municipalities
do perceive a divergence between institutional advantage and the
public interest, the prevailing norms-professional, institutional,
and social-require them to disregard that advantage and act for
the public. The private enterprise is expected to maximize its
own good, rather than society's; the government enterprise is not.
One possible conclusion from this is that public enterprise lia-
bility will exert no influence and do no harm; it will provide
assured compensation to victims without creating the overdeterrent
effects that might be feared from the imposition of large personal
liability on individual officials. This is probably the strongest
argument for curtailing the corporate tort immunity of public
organizations while preserving or even strengthening the personal
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immunity of the officials themselves. Another possible conclusion,
however, is that there is no need for enterprise liability from the
standpoint of deterrence and much risk that the prospect of
crushing damage awards against the enterprise would swamp the
norms requiring indifference to institutional self-interest and pro-
duce over-deterrence effects nearly as great as would personal
liability for individual officials. Even if one leans, as I do, to the
former conclusion, one must take the latter possibility very
seriously.
The factors that militate against tort liability for public offi-
cials, and also public entities, are most clearly presented in the
case of judges. No one suggests that judges should be liable in
damages for (what other judges or juries might find to be) their
unreasonable decisions. We expect that conscience, concern for
reputation, professional ethics, oath of office, long or permanent
tenure, and the absence of direct personal stake in the outcome,
will induce them to act impartially and in the public interest
even without financial incentives to do so. In this setting, the
threat of damage liability, unless perceived by the judge to be
uniform for all possible dispositions of the cases to be decided,
becomes a source of bias rather than a cure for it.
The considerations that weigh against damage liability for
formal adjudicative bodies apply also, though with diminished force,
to governmental units engaged in executive operations such as
education or law enforcement. If a school system must pay dam-
ages for every wrongful suspension of a student, fewer students will
be suspended-fewer, perhaps, than might be desirable in the inter-
est of sound education. Similarly, if a police department is liable
in damages for wrongful arrest, and if this disincentive is passed
along to its employees, there will be fewer arrests, both lawful and
unlawful, as police officers steer clear of situations that might ex-
pose them to litigation or departmental disciplinary proceedings.
The reduced arrest rate may or may not be closer to the socially
optimal level, depending on the extent to which, in the absence of
damage liability, other variables-the incentive structure of the de-
partment, the values and personalities of those self-selected for
police work, and the normative climate of the job-are conducive
to overzealous law enforcement and insensitivity to constitutional
rights. Such questions can be answered, if at all, only after careful
empirical examination. The modest point I am making is that
familiar enterprise liability reasoning is not automatically trans-
ferable from the private to the public sector.
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